Lessons From The Legion

Nick Drage Path Dependence Limited DevSecCon - 19 Oct 18

V 4.11 - 19Oct




Lessons From the Legion

(The DevSecCon Remix)

NICK DRAGE








Lessons From the Legion


(The DevSecCon Remix)

NICK DRAGE



I have a question







You'll Have Questions...

- Available afterwards
- Contact details at the end
- All references blogged
- All media owner's copyright
- If no credit, probably Pixabay





Nick Drage – Path Dependence – @SonOfSunTzu



Win the Cyberwar With Zero Trust

John Kindervag

Field CTO



The Four Levels of War

Grand Strategy(Political)

The Ultimate Goal

Strategy

The Big Idea

Tactics

The Things You Use

Operations

The Way You Use Them



The Four Levels of Cyberwar

Grand Strategy (Political)

Stop Data Breaches

Strategy

Zero Trust

Tactics

Tools/Policies

Operations

Platform



The Four Levels of Cyberwar

Grand Strategy(Political)

The Ultimate Goal

Strategy

The Big Idea

Tactics

The Things You Use

Operations

The Way You Use Them



Tactics

- System Administrators
- Developers
- Security Operations



Nick Drage - Path Dependence - @SonOfSunTzu

How do we learn and train







BreachLevelIndex.com



BreachLevelIndex.com



CVE's per year/month






Insight Report

The Global Risks Report 2018 13th Edition



Figure I: The Global Risks Landscape 2018



What's wrong

- Nothing wrong with golf
- ... or training for golf
- ... if you're going to play golf.



Image: Costume SuperCentre

The Four Levels of Cyberwar

Grand Strategy

(Political)





Strategy

Tactics


Operations



TRIZ


- Russian "Theory of Inventive Problem Solving"
- Characteristics of problems
- Patterns in solutions
- A sufficient level of abstraction
- Use other's solutions





A technique of Engineering Creativity and Inventive Thinking in Problem Solving


A technique of Engineering Creativity and Inventive Thinking in Problem Solving




By Oxford Creativity - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0 https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=40358248

Nick Drage – Path Dependence – @SonOfSunTzu

Strategic Inflection Point



Double S-Curve Model





2013 LIFT Conference: Driving Innovation-Based Growth




So ...



Nick Drage – Path Dependence – @SonOfSunTzu




- Utterly incomprehensible from outside
- Complex
- Team games
- Highly specialised
 - By situation
 - Attack or Defend
- Fight over territory
- Offensive or defensive playbooks












SEAHAWKS












Seattle Seahawks' Defense – 2011 to 2017

- Sherman CornerBack
- Thomas Free Safety
- Chancellor Strong Safety
- Everyone



2012-2015

Fewest points allowed 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 – NFL Record



 $\label{eq:linear_norm} \mbox{Nick Drage} - \mbox{Path Dependence} - \mbox{@SonOfSunTzu}$

Image: ESPN

2012-2015


- Lead the league Fewest Passing Yards Allowed
- Lead the league Fewest First Downs
- 2nd Quarterback Pressures
- 4th Rushing Yards per carry
- 6th in takeways
- Always high in DVOA ranking



LESSON – "shift left" your conflict



Practice is everything











	SEA	Î	s 💸
Offense	Starter	2nd String	3rd String
QB	Russell Wilson	rvaris Jac'son	Terrelle Pryor
НВ	Marshawn Lynch	rbin	

Anthony McCoy

Paul Richardson

Sidney Rice

Kevin Nory ood

Alvin ailey

Caylir Hauptmann

Le Jel Jeanpierre

teve Schilling

Justin Britt

2nd String

Kevi Williams

Jesse Wiams

Cassius Mysh Malcolm Smith

Heath Farwell

Michael Morgan

Tharold Simon

Phillip Adams

DeShawn Shead

Jeron Johnson

2nd String

g Scruggs

FB

Zach Miller

Russell

James Carp

Max Unger

J.R. Sweezy

Michael Bowie

Starter

Michael Benne

Tony McD

Brandor

Willson

y Harvin

aldwin

earse

⊿ne

Irvin

Wagner

ريم. Wright

Richard Sherman

Byron Maxwell

Jeremy Lane

Kam Chancellor

Earl Thomas

Starter

Steven Hauschka

Jon Ryan

Clint Gresham

TE-Y

TE-H

WR1

WR2

SWR

LT

LG

C RG

RT

Defense DLE

DLT

DRT

DRE

SLB

MLB

WLB

LCB

RCB

SCB

SS

FS

Special

Teams

P

LSN

Spencer Ware Derrick Coleman



	SEA	Î	S
Offense	Starter	2nd String	3rd String
QB	Russell Wilson	rvaris Jackson	Terrelle Pryor
НВ	Marshawn Lynch	h bent Trbin	
HB2	Christine Michael		

Kiero Small

Bryan Waters

Ricardo Lockette

Greg Van Roten

3rd String

Benson Mayowa

Jordan Hill/D'Anthony Smith

Jimmy Staten

O'Brien Schofield

Kevin Pierre-Louis

AJ Jefferson Eric Pinkins

The Caffrey Triangle










Trap #10: Threat Modeling at the Wrong Time

"Sir, we've analyzed their attack pattern, and there is a danger"



Image: Frasier Scott



ON THE HIGHWAY TO SHELL

Breaking Ground

ATT&CKing the Status Quo: Improving Threat Intel and Cyber Defense with MITRE ATT&CK
Katie Nickels, John Wunder

So what does this get us?

Status Quo	ATT&CKing threat intel
So. Many. Reports!	Structures threat intel so it's easier to consume a lot of it
Tough to apply intel to defenses	Provides a way to directly compare intel to defenses
Reliance on indicators	Moves to TTPs and behaviors

Plus!

- → Gives us a common language to communicate
- → Allows us to compare groups

BG - ATT&CKing the Status Quo: Improving Threat Intel and Cyber Defense with MITRE ATT&CK - Katie Ni

So what does this get us?

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The Base of Sand Problem

A RAND NOTE

N-3148-OSD/DARPA

The Base of Sand Problem: A White Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling

Paul K. Davis, Donald Blumenthal

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Footnote 3

such as SIMNET; and knowledge-based modeling concepts. Unfortunately, however, there is a problem that has already become a limiting factor in what can be accomplished, one that is not yet widely recognized. We call this the base of sand.

"Battle outcomes have historically borne no relationship to the raw force ratio...

...what matters is the ratio of effective forces" (emphasis mine)

³To illustrate how critical the use of combat models is in analyzing empirical data, consider that battle outcomes have historically borne no relationship to the raw force ratio. By contrast, when the outcome data is passed through models sensitive to situational factors such as terrain, preparations, asymmetries in fighting effectiveness due to better organization and training, and so forth, one finds that the data actually makes sense and that what matters is a ratio of effective forces. Unfortunately, the values of some of the key variables may not be known in advance. As a result, the models are sometimes more useful for after-the-fact description than for reliable prediction.

"Less than 2% of vulnerabilities are actively exploited in the wild, making traditional remediation very inefficient, costly, and time-consuming."



Kenna Security @KennaSecurity

Have you heard about our report with @cyentiainst this morning? It provides a quantitative look at the effectiveness of common remediation strategies. See the full report here: bit.ly/2IGrlG0

12:18 pm - 15 May 2018

Jeremiah Grossman

CEO of Bit Discovery, Professional Hacker, Black Belt in Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, Off-Road Race Car Driver, Founder of WhiteHat Security, and Maui resident.

MONDAY, MAY 07, 2018

All these vulnerabilities, rarely matter.

There is a serious misalignment of interests between Application Security vulnerability assessment vendors and their customers. Vendors are incentivized to report everything they possible can, even issues that rarely matter. On the other hand, customers just want the vulnerability reports that are <u>likely</u> to get them hacked. Every finding beyond that is a waste of time, money, and energy, which is precisely what's happening every day. Let's begin exploring this with some context:

ABOUT ME





Jeremiah Grossman

Jeremiah Grossman's career spans nearly 20 years and has lived a literal lifetime in computer security to become one of the industry's biggest


LESSON – Eliminate the big play







NIST Cyber Security Framework







Technology



NIST Cyber Security Framework





How breaches work (percep

Getting hacked (common perception)

Attacker's Exploit Succeeds





How breaches work (perception vs reality)



Getting hacked (common perception)

Attacker's Exploit Succeeds



Reality

- Exploit succeeds
- 2. Escalate privileges
- 3. Scans network
- 4. Dumps/cracks creds
- 5. Pivots
- Creates additional accounts
- 7. Exfiltrates data


Introducing the "Cyber Defense Matrix"



,	Identify	Protect	Detect	Respond	Recover	
Devices						
Applications						
Networks						
Data						
Users						
Degree of	Technology				People	
Dependency	3,		Process			
@soupilyu		5			RSA Confere	nce2016

Left and Right of "Boom"







Asset Classes

DEVICES

Workstations, servers, VoIP phones, tablets, IoT, storage, network devices, infrastructure, etc.



The software, interactions, and application flows on the devices



The connections and traffic flowing among devices and applications



The information residing on, traveling through, or processed by the resources above



The people using the resources listed above

Operational Functions

IDENTIFY



Inventorying assets and vulns, measuring attack surface, baselining normal, risk profiling

PROTECT



Preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation

DETECT



Discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics

RESPOND



Acting on events, eradicating intrusion footholds, assessing damage, coordinating, reconstructing events forensically

RECOVER




Returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned

RS∧Conference2016


Enterprise Security Market Segments





Security Technologies Mapped by Asset Class













































APPS

The software, interactions, and application flows on the devices







Return Path





















FireEye SOURCE inc



The connections and traffic flowing among devices and applications



Lancope^{*}





















The information residing on, traveling through, or processed by the resources above





Symantec |











m/Voltage





PHISHLABS



The people using the resources listed above





@ chshchr





SECURONIX







Recorded Future



Disclaimer: Vendors shown are representative only. No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here.



Security Technologies Mapped by Operational **Functions**





endorsement should be construed because they are shown here.

RSAConference2016


documenting les sons

learned


Security Technologies by Asset Classes & Operational Functions



RSAConference2016



As we're meant to be resilient now



Source: ISF - Cyber Security Strategies




NCSC - "Cyber resilience - nothing to sneeze at"



Ü


Blog - Black Swan Security





Nick Drage – Path Dependence – @SonOfSunTzu

OODA: Observe – Orient – Decide - Act



Nick Drage – Path Dependence – @SonOfSunTzu




Image: Mark Skillen

LESSON – out hit your opponent

Content of Models

Phenomena Omitted or Buried. Typically, ground-combat simulations focus on
complex calculations of attrition while treating command-control processes, tactics,
and strategy in terms of stereotypes embedded in the data bases. This ignores the
evidence of history that such matters (and other "soft factors") are first-order
determinants of both deterrence and war outcomes, and should therefore be
highlighted.¹²

The evidence of history is that soft factors: command-control processes, tactics, and strategy, are <u>first-order determinants</u> of both deterrence and war outcomes (emphasis mine)








RICHARD SHERMAN

HE'S A FREAKING


MONSTER.

HE DAMAGES

PEOPLE'S SOULS. 11



Bartle's Taxonomy of Player Types









Making A Dent, Making A Difference And Making A Dollar - Haroon Meer





Everyhing You Know Is Wrong - Paul Midian







Keynote: The Seven Axioms of Security

Seven Axioms of Security: 6

The Best Defense IS CREATIVE Defense



Image: Meadow Ellis

Image: DevSecCon



Solving Threat Detection - Alex Davies

Defender's Dilemma

The intruder only needs to exploit one of the victims in order to compromise the enterprise.

Intruder's Dilemma

The defender only needs to detect one of the indicators of the intruder's presence to initiate incident response within the enterprise.

Richard Bejtlich - https://taosecurity.blogspot.de/2009/05/defenders-dilemma-and-intruders-dilemma.html

Att&ck™ The Attacker - Christian Kollee





GASLIGHTING WITH HONEYPITS AND MIRAGES

DESTROYING DISCOVERY TO DEPLETE ATTACKERS

Catherine (Kate) Pearce

Sr. Security Consultant, Cisco Security Services


"Never attempt to win by force what can be won by deception."

Niccolò Machiavelli,


The Prince

DECEPTION EXAMPLES – INFORMATION SECURITY

From Almeshekah



POSSIBILTIES - TRANSITIONS



TRANSIENT PROBLEMS - MISSPEAKING

ANSWER PRETTY MUCH AS EXPECTED BUT NOT QUITE


- Random errors
 - Random timing errors
 - Random omissions
 - Random bitflips
 - Random endian changes
 - Random number changes
 - Badly signed things
 - Badly encrypted things
 - Random wrong content

- Nonrandom errors to break things
 - Invalid characters/bytes
 - Terminal command characters
 - Random "unallocated" memory
 - Bad pointer values
 - Filesystems of the wrong type
 - Impossible filenames
 - Timing "errors"
 - "Omissions"

GASLIGHTING - MORE

- Uncrackable Hashes
- Decoy Systems, Ports, Services
- Manufactured Vuln Emulation
 - E.g. MS08-067?
- Decoy Vulns (static)
- Decoy Vulns (non exploitable {buffer overflow in managed lang})
- Nondeterministic Existence
- For you only existence
- Transient Vulns
- · Transient Systems, Ports, Services
- Vuln neutering
- · Vuln Chains leading nowhere

- Benign Passthrough
- Honeypot Passthrough
- Trickster passthrough
- One time Vulnerability Generation
- · One time vulns as canaries
- Answering questions you never asked
- Answering different questions
- Fake answers
- Fake Data
- Silent Failure (denying you ever agreed)
- Rewriting page format dynamically to break validation and cscripting



CHANGE CONTROL?





COUNTERMEASURE 2017: Kelly Shortridge - The Red Pill of Resilience



Randomly kills instances to test their ability to withstand failure.

It also makes persistence really hard.



San Francisco | February 13-17 | Moscone Center




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Solving Cybersecurity in the Next Five Years Systematizing Progress for the Short Term



Solving Cybersecurity in the Next Five Years: Systematizing Progress for the Short Term

Mapping to the NIST Cyber Security Framework




#RSAC


Solving Cybersecurity in the Next Five Years: Systematizing Progress for the Short Term

Not a blinky box you can buy, install and ignore



Agile is not a thing you buy. Agile is a thing you are.









Follow

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

#SunTzu







LESSONS

- Use others' lessons
- Practice Is Everything
- Eliminate the Big Play
- Out Hit Your Opponent

 Or try to Golf our way through <u>American</u> Football...



 $\label{eq:linear_norm} \textbf{Nick Drage} - \textbf{Path Dependence} - \textbf{@SonOfSunTzu}$



 $\label{eq:linear_norm} \textbf{Nick Drage} - \textbf{Path Dependence} - \textbf{@SonOfSunTzu}$



[Nick Drage

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LONDON 18-19 OCT 2018

BREAK BREAK BREAK